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FRAUD ON THE MARKET: THE 
DECLINE OF RELIANCE IN A 
lOb-5 ACTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Affliliated Ute Citi-
zens v. United States, l there has been considerable variation 
among the circuits regarding the requirement of reliance as an 
element of an action under rule 10b-5 of the federal securities 
regulations. S The differences seem to stem from a disagreement 
as to the underlying purposes of the securities regulations. While 
the regulations were established to force disclosure of material 
investment information and to maintain market stability, they 
were also designed to protect the investing public. a In an at-
tempt to reconcile these sometimes disparate purposes, one cir-
cuit has designed a theory since labeled "fraud on the market."4 
While it does not eliminate the reliance requirement of a lOb-5 
action, this theory does substantially lessen the plaintiff's bur-
den of proof. The reaction to this theory has led to further dif-
ferences of opinion regarding exactly what the role of reliance 
should be, and the extent to which reliance must be proven to 
make out a prima facie case of securities fraud.' 
1. 406 U.S. 128 (1971). 
2. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 
434 U.S. 875 (1977); Chelsea Aasoc's. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975); Blackie 
v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Carraa v. 
Burns, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975); Schlick v. Penn· Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 
(2nd Cir. 1974); Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880 (5th 
Cir. 1973). 
3. Eight policies have been identified aa the underlying goala of rule 10b·5, (17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b·5 (1981». They are: "(1) maintaining free securities markets; (2) equal· 
izing accesa to information; (3) inauring equal bargaining strength; (4) providing for dis· 
closure; (5) protecting investors; (6) assuring fairne88; (7) building investor confidence; 
and (8) detening violationa while compensating victims." 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT or 
RULE 10b·5, at § 6 (1980). 
4. Blackie v. Banack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 816 (1976). 
6. See panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2nd Cir. 1981); Shores v. Sklar. 647 F.2d 462 
407 
1
Haggerty: Fraud on the Market
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
408 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:407 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Securities Act of 19336 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934' (hereinafter "Acts" or "Securities Acts") were enacted 
to protect investors from the many abuses which led to the stock 
market crash of 1929.8 Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under sec-
tion 10-b of the Securities Exchange Act as a provision designed 
to protect investors from manipulative and deceptive practices 
in connection with the sale or purchase of securities.s 
Rule 10b-5 is grounded in the common law tort of deceit. tO 
Dean Prosser lists the traditional elements of deceit as: 
(1) a false representation made by the defendant; 
(2) knowledge or belief by the defendant that the 
representation is false; (3) defendant's intent to 
induce plaintiff to act or refrain from acting in re-
liance upon the misrepresentation; (4) justifiable 
reliance on the part of the plaintiff in acting or 
refraining from acting; and (5) actual damage to 
the plaintiff as a result of such reliance.ll 
The federal courts, attempting to compensate parties injured by 
(5th Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3377 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1981) (No. 81-
839); Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1978). 
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (1976). 
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b to 77e, 77j, 77m, 770, 77s, 78& to 78d, 78e to 78k-l, 781, 78m to 
780,780-3,780-4, 78p to 78q-7, 78r to 78dd-2, 77ee to 78hh, 78ii, 78jj, 78kk (1976). 
8. See Note, Municipal Bonds: Is There a Need for Mandatory Disclosure?, 58 J. 
URB. L. 255, 260 (1981). 
9. Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and is set out in 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). It 
states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by 
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or &ale of any 
security. 
10. Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975). [hereinafter cited as The Reliance Requirement). 
11. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971). 
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fraudulent securities transactions, have used deceit as merely a 
starting point for a 10b-5 action in order to develop a federal 
common law that "will promote the broad policy goals of 10b-
5."12 
The Supreme Court, however, has reversed an earlier trend 
of expanding liability under 10b-5, beginning with its 1975 deci-
sion in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,18 and most 
recently in the holding in Chiarella v. United States. It The 
Court has moved toward a more stringent common law ap-
proach, requiring proof of the traditional elements of fraud and 
deceit in any 10b-5 action!!! 
While the Supreme Court's trend appears to be one of con-
traction of liability, the circuit courts still follow the expansive 
precedent established by Affiliated Ute: When the defendant 
has not disclosed relevant information, a plaintiff is allowed to 
establish the reliance necessary to prove fraud through the use 
of a rebuttable presumption;18 where there is an omission, the 
defendant must disprove reliance.17 
Utilizing this presumption as a sign that the Court would 
permit recovery where the plaintiff is faced with the almost im-
possible burden of proving reliance on information not known to 
him, the circuit courts have expanded the plaintiff's ability to 
12. The Reliance Requirement, supra note 10, at 585, (citing Note, The Nature and 
Scope of the Reliance Requirement in Private Actions under SEC Rule 10b-5, 24 CASB 
W. RES. L. REV. 363, 367 (1973». 
13. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
14. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
15. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), (reaf-
firming the Birnbaum rule that the plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities to 
have standing in a private 10b-5 action); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 
(1976) (scienter must be alleged in a private action under 10b-5); Santa Fe Industries v. 
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (fraud will not include overreaching by a controlling share-
holder; it must involve actual deception); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (scienter 
required in actions brought by the SEC); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) 
(no criminal liability absent an affirmative duty to disclose). See generally Note, Chiarel-
la v. United States: The Supreme Court's Common Law Catch to Market Insider Liabil-
ity Under 10b-5, 14 J. MAR. L. REv. 847 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Common Law 
Catch). 
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plead and prove the reliance element in a lOb-5 action. IS "Fraud 
on the market" or reliance upon the "integrity of the market" is 
one such expansion. II Essentially, the reasoning is that the 
plaintiff should be able to rely on the fact that the price of any 
security which can be purchased or sold on the market has been 
set without manipulation or artificial inflation, and, thus, rely 
indirectly on the truth of the underlying representations of the 
validity of the stock.20 
Because there is little in the way of legislative intent relat-
ing to the goals of lOb-5, the courts have discerned the underly-
ing policies of the rules from legislative and judicial history.1l 
One of the policies which has been identified is the protection of 
investors in the market. Congress chose to implement this policy 
by imposing a duty of honesty and fair dealing through the re-
quirement of disclosure. III The Acts were not intended to create 
a form of investor's insurance, however, since the plaintiff still 
must prove causation.28 Liability is qualified, for "it must be 
kept in mind that the nation's welfare depends upon the mainte-
18. See cases cited note 2, supra. 
19. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906·07 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 429 U.S. 
816 (1976). 
20. Id. 
21. The purpose of the bill is to protect the investing public and 
honest business .... The aim is to prevent further exploita· 
tion ... of the public by the sale of unsound fraudulent and 
worthless securities through misrepresentation; to place ade· 
Quate and true information before the investor; to protect 
honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation, 
against the competition afforded by dishonest securities of· 
fered to the public through crooked promotion; to restore the 
confidence of the prospective investor in his ability to select 
sound securities; to bring into productive channels of industry 
and development capital which has grown timid to the point 
of hoarding; and to aid in providing employment and restoring 
buying and consuming power. 
United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775·76 (1979) (citing S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 
1st Sess., 1 (1933». See generally Common Law Catch, supra note 15. 
22. Rule 10b·5 attempts to "Qualify the doctrine of caveat emptor by imposing stan· 
dards of honesty and fair dealing." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 336 (1967). In Santa 
Fe Indus. u. Green, the Supreme Court noted that it had repeatedly "described the 'fun-
damental purpose' of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as implementing a 'philosophy 
of full disclosure'; once full and fair disclosure has ocurred, the fairness of the terms of 
the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the statute." 430 U.S. 462, 477.78 
(1977). 
23. List v. Fashion Park, 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2nd Cir. 1965). 
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nance of a viable, vigorous business community."" Acknowledg-
ing the conflict in the legislative scheme between investor pro-
tection and the survival of the business community, the courts 
have sought a balance by constructing workable limitations to 
liability under rule lOb-5/11i requiring something more than that 
"someone simply do something bad in connection with a 
purchase or sale of securities."IG 
One of the traditional limitations to a defendant's liability 
has been the requirement that the plaintiff prove reliance on the 
defendant's misrepresentations or, in the case of an omission, 
that the facts withheld were material to his investment decision. 
Developing the Reliance Requirement 
In List v. Fashion Park,17 a suit which arose because of an 
insider's nondisclosure when purchasing a minority share-
holder's stock, the Second Circuit analyzed the test for reliance 
in common law terms: "IT)he test of 'reliance' is whether 'the 
misrepresentation is a substantial factor in determining the 
course of conduct which results in [the recipient's) loss.' "16 The 
court imposed a requirement that the plaintiff prove the defen-
dant's . fraudulent conduct actually caused the injury. 
The Supreme Court first attempted to define the elements 
of a lOb-5 cause of action in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United 
States. It In Ute, there was no proof of reliance upon defendant's 
24. Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 91 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting 
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804-05 (5th Cir. 1970)). 
25. [d. 
26. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 961 (2d ed. 1968). 
27. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1975). The plaintiff in List was an experienced investor 
who sold his shares of Fashion Park stock upon the advice of his broker. The broker 
knew that two of the directors of Fashion Park were at that time bidding upon the stock, 
but did not consider it important enough to disclose to the plaintiff. The directors pur-
chased plaintiff's stock. A merger was announced approximately three weeks later, offer-
ing $50 a share to all minority shareholders; the plaintiff had sold his shares for $18.50 
each. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired to purchase his stock by not disclos-
ing their status as directors, which would have been a fact pertinent to his decision. The 
court found that the plaintiff would have negotiated the sale even if he had known that 
the purchasers were directors of the corporation. 
28. [d. at 462. 
29. 406 U.S. 128 (1971). Affiliated Ute involved a suit by members of an Indian 
tribe against bank employees who had arranged sales of the tribal members' stock. The 
stock represented a distribution of the tribe's assets: cash, oil, land, gas and mineral 
rights, and unadjudicated and unliquidated claims against the government. The employ-
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fraudulent conduct because the conduct principally had been si-
lence when there was a duty to disclose. so Finding that while re-
liance was necessary to establish causation, reliance upon an 
omission would be almost impossible to· prove. The Court held: 
Under the circumstances of this case, involving 
primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of re-
liance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is 
necessary is that the facts withheld be material in 
the sense that a reasonable investor might have 
considered them important in the making of this 
decision . . . . This obligation to disclose and 
this withholding of a material fact establish the 
requisite element of causation. II 
In Ute the Court eased the plaintiff's burden, but it did not 
eliminate the causation requirement of reliance. Instead, it rec-
ognized that reliance should be presumed when there has been a 
material deception through omission. 
After Ute, the Second Circuit discussed the two components 
of causation which are necessary to establish causation-in-fact in 
a fraudulent securities transaction. II Where the defendant's ac-
tion principally concerned misrepresentation, the plaintiff must 
show both "loss causation-that the misrepresentation or omis-
sions caused the economic harm-and transaction causa-
tion-that the violations in question caused the appellant to en-
gage in the transaction in question."" While loss causation is 
relatively easy to show, proof of transaction causation requires 
the plaintiff to prove reliance on the defendant's misrepresenta-
tions. However, because of the Ute presumption, in an omissions 
case the plaintiff need not prove reliance to establish transaction 
causation. She must show instead that the facts in question were 
ees received various commissions for their market-making activity, yet at no time re-
vealed to the tribe that they were gaining financially from the sales, or that the shares 
were selling at a higher price than the members were receiving. 
30. rd. at 153. 
31. rd. at 153-54. 
32. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2nd Cir. 1974). This division 
of causation, requiring two forms of proof, has been pursued by both commentators and 
other circuits. See Continental Grain v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 
1979); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); 
Issen v. GSC Enterprises, 522 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1981). See 01&0 A. BROMBERG, SE-
CURmES FRAUD-SEC RULE 10b-5, at § 8.7(1), at 215-16 (1967); Crane, An Analysis 01 
Causation Under Rule lOb-5, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 99 (1981). 
33. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Co., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2nd Cir. 1974). 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss2/3
1982] FRAUD ON THE MARKET 413 
"material in the sense that a reasonable investigator [sic] might 
have considered them important."84 
In its decision in Chiarella v. United States,as the Supreme 
Court again referred to reliance as an element of a lOb-5 action. 
As long as an affirmative duty to disclose is placed on the defen-
dant, any breach of that duty and reliance by the plaintiff upon 
the breach will give rise to liability: 
Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations 
have established that silence in connection with 
the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a 
fraud actionable under section lOb despite the ab-
sence of statutory language or legislative history 
specifically addressing the legality of nondisclo-
sure. But such liability is premised upon a duty to 
disclose arising from a relationship of trust and 
confidence between parties to a transaction." 
Chiarella notably requires the existence of a duty between 
the parties to the transaction. The Court refused to impose a 
general duty upon all participants in market transactions, re-
quiring only some recognized relationship which caused the de-
fendant's silence to become intentionally misleading.a, 
Since Ute, there has been a disagreement among the circuits 
as to when the presumption of reliance should be invoked. The 
critical distinction is between misrepresentation and omission.aa 
When there has been primarily affirmative misrepresentation, 
proof of reliance is required; when there has been primarily 
34. 1d. at 380 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United Statea, 406 U.S. at 152-53 
(1971)). 
35.- 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
36. 1d. at 230. 
37. [T]he element required to make silence fraudulent-a duty to 
disclose-is absent in this case .... We cannot affirm peti-
tioner's conviction without recognizing a general duty between 
all participants in market transactions to forgo [sic] actions 
based on material, non public information. Formulation of 
such a broad duty, which departs radically from the estab-
lished doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship be-
tween two parties. . . , should not be undertaken absent some 
explicit evidence of congressional intent. 
1d. at 232-33. 
38. See cases cited note 2, supra. See also Crane, supra note 32, at 102-03; The 
Reliance Requirement, supra note lO, at 588-89. 
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omission or manipulation, reliance is presumed from materiality. 
Protecting the Integrity of the Market 
In Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casu-
alty Co.,8e the Supreme Court first defined the causal link of 
lOb-5. The Court found that Congress had attempted to bar any 
fraud used "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securi-
ties.·O The Court read lOb-5 as a means of insuring that decep-
tive and manipulative devices would not be used either in face-
to-face transactions or organized markets:41 
[Section lOb] is not "limited to preserving the in· 
tregity of the securities markets" ... , though 
that purpose is included. Section lOb must be 
read flexibly, not technically and restrictively. 
Since there was a "sale" of a security and since 
fraud was used "in connection with" it, there is 
redress under § lOb. . . ." 
While the reliance by· a plaintiff on a particular misstate-
ment or omission might be relatively easy to prove or disprove in 
a face-to-face transaction, an open market transaction poses a 
far more difficult problem. The Ninth Circuit dealt with this 
problem when it developed a doctrine designed as an extension 
of the Ute presumption of reliance. 
This doctrine of "fraud on the market" was first articulated 
in Blackie v. Barrack.u In that case, the plaintiff sought to cer-
tify a large class of shareholders who had invested over a sub-
stantial period of time. The plaintiffs asserted reliance on the 
inflated prices of the stock, which were the result of the defen-
dant's alleged misrepresentations of the financial integrity of the 
corporation. The court found that while reliance is necessary to 
demonstrate the causal connection between the defendant's 
wrongdoing and the plaintiffs' harm, causation could be estab-
lished adequately by proof of purchase and the materiality of 
the misrepresentation without any direct proof of reliance.·· The 
court explained: 
39. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
40. ld. at 12·13. 
41. ld. at 12. 
42.ld. 
43. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). 
44. ld. at 906. 
8
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Materiality circumstantially establishes the reli-
ance of some market traders and hence the infla-
tion in the stock price-when the purchase is 
made, the causational chain between defendant's 
conduct and plaintiff's loss is sufficiently estab-
lished to make out a prima facie case. 
A purchaser on the stock exchanges . . . relies 
generally on the supposition that the market price 
is validly set and that no unsuspected manipula-
tion has artificially inflated the price, and thus in-
directly on the truth of the representations un-
derlying the stock price. . . .411 
415 
The Blackie court reasoned that individual "transaction 
causation"46 could be inferred from materiality in an open mar-
ket transaction; and shifted the burden of disproving the prima 
facie case to the defendant.47 The Ninth Circuit found that the 
defendant could disprove such a presumption in at least two 
ways: "(1) by disproving materiality or by proving that, despite 
materiality, an insufficient number of traders relied to inflate 
the price; and (2) by proving that an individual plaintiff pur-
chased despite knowledge of the falsity of the representation, or 
that he would have, had he known of it. "48 
The court wrote of reliance as an alternative method of es-
tablishing causation. In its view, causation could be established 
by materiality as well as reliance; the concepts are not necessa-
rily concomitant.49 Reliance, however, is not eliminated, for it 
begins to playa more important role for the defense. The defen-
dant must now argue that in spite of the alleged materiality of 
the fraud, the plaintif in fact did not rely on any of the repre-
sentations, or that an insufficient number of other traders relied 
on the fraud to actually have any effect on the price. 
The reasoning of Blackie was recently adopted by the Fifth 
Circuit in Shores v. Sklar'° and the Second Circuit in Panzirer 
45. Id. at 907. 
46. This means that the violation caused the plaintiff to engage in the transaction 
and is to be distinguished from "1088 causation." See text accompanying note 33, supra. 
47. 524 F.2d at 906 (9th Cir. 1975). 
48.Id. 
49. Id. at 906-07 n.22. 
50. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981). 
9
Haggerty: Fraud on the Market
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
416 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:407 
V. Wolf."1 In Panzirer, the plaintiff asserted the "fraud on the 
market" theory after she purchased stock based on a report she 
had read in the Wall Street Journal. While she alleged material 
misrepresentations and omissions in the defendant corporation's 
annual report, she had never actually seen that document. She 
argued that, had the annual report been accurate, the Wall 
Street Journal would never have issued a favorable article and 
she would not have made the purchase. r.a The court agreed and 
reasoned that just as material misrepresentations and omissions 
will be presumed to affect the price of securities, so they should 
be presumed to affect the information in the "heard on the 
street" column:"8 "Where the plaintiff acts upon information 
from those working in or reporting on the securities markets, 
and where that information is circulated after a material misrep-
resentation or omission, the plaintiff has stated a sufficient claim 
of reliance on the misrepresentation or omission."&4 
The Shores court also applied the reasoning of Blackie, 
finding that the plaintiff need not rely specifically on material 
misrepresentations and omissions relating to any single disclo-
sure document. If the plaintiff can prove that the existence of 
the security on the market resulted in a perpetration of fraud 
upon the investment community, and the security was pur-
chased in reliance on the validity of the market, the plaintiff will 
be given an opportunity to recover.&11 
In Shores, the alleged fraud dealt with an issue of municipal 
revenue bonds. These bonds were issued after a financing 
scheme was formulated based on several allegedly fraudulent 
misrepresentations and omissions."8 In this case, as in Panzirer, 
the plaintiff had never seen the offering circUlar which he 
claimed was fraudulent. He based his purchasing decision on his 
51. 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981). 
52. Jd. at 366·67. 
53. Jd. 
54. Jd. at 367. 
55. 647 F.2d at 464 (5th Cir. 1981). 
56. Essentially, the defendants in this case had engaged in a scheme to persuade the 
municipality of Frisco City, Alabama to incorporate an industrial development board. 
The defendants represented themselves as being experienced developers, financially se-
cure and owning sufficient assets to cover a bond issue should it be declared in default. 
The board issued bonds based upon these representations. The defendants were unable 
to make any payments, which were necessary to amortize the bonds, and the bonds were 
subsequently declared to be in default. Jd. at 464-67. 
10
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broker's representations, which in turn were based on market 
information.1I7 
Shores is perhaps the most interesting of the Blackie prog-
eny, for the majority and the dissent in their separate opinions 
develop two distinct arguments relating to the application of re-
liance in a lOb-5 action. The majority, while noting that the 
plaintiff's admitted nonreliance upon the offering circular would 
defeat his lOb-5 claim based on material misrepresentations or 
omissionslls found that the allegation of a more pervasive scheme 
to defraud and fraudulent course of business would not fail due 
to lack of reliance on the circular. They reasoned that if those 
securities were placed on the market due to fraudulent misrepre-
sentations and omissions, and the plaintiff had relied on the in-
tegrity of the market to establish their validity, then adequate 
causation-in-fact had been established. liB Thus, the presence of 
the securities in the market was material "in the sense that a 
reasonable investor might have considered [those facts] impor-
tant in making his investment decisions. "60 
The majority analyzed the plaintiff's allegations in light of 
what they considered to be the principal purposes of the Securi-
ties Acts. While they perceived disclosure as a means to insure 
57. [d. at 467. 
58. The court referred to this as a 10b-5(2) claim. For applicable statutory language, 
see note 9 supra. 
59. The Shores court noted that misrepresentation actions brought under rule 10b-
5(2) may require a different showing of transaction causation than those actions at-
tempting to show a scheme or course of business intended to defraud. The court ob-
served that doing away with the requirement that the misrepresentation be a substantial 
factor in determining the course of conduct which results in the loss, in a conventional 
10b-5(2) case, could establish a form of investor's insurance. 647 F.2d at 469 n.5. The 
court also outlined the necessary elements of an action under 10b-5(1) and (3). The 
plaintiff's burden of proof will be to show: 
(1) defendants knowingly conspired to bring securities onto 
the market which were not entitled to be marketed, intending 
to defraud purchasers, (2) plaintiff reasonably relied on the se-
curities' availability on the market as an indication of their 
apparent genuineness, and (3) as a result of the scheme to de-
fraud, plaintiff suffered a loss. 
[d. at 469-70. 
60. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 153-54. The Shores court 
relied on the reasoning of Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2nd Cir. 
1974), for establishing transaction causation through materiality in a case where a fraud 
had been perpetrated through an omission. 647 F.2d at 419. See also text accompanying 
note 33, supra. 
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investor protection, in their view that was not the ultimate 
goal. S1 They found that in this factual situation, where the plain-
tiff alleges a pervasive scheme to defraud, the Acts allow a plain-
tiff to rely "on the integrity of the market to the extent that the 
securities it offers to him for purchase are entitled to be in the 
market place."62 
The majority separated 10b-5 into two district causes of ac-
tion, finding support for actions in the language of the rule it-
self.sa They reasoned that when the focus of the fraud shifts 
from a particular document to a more pervasive fraud, the 
search for causation must also shift and the plaintiff need not 
rely on any specific document.84 
The dissent in Shores believed that the majority's theory of 
investor protection defeated the equally important goal of mak-
ing informed investment decisions.eo The dissent reasoned that 
by distinguishing between those securities which were initially 
entitled to be marketed (and later become the object of some 
fraud), and those which, absent fraud, would never have been 
marketed, the plaintiffs burden of proof of reliance and recov-
ery would turn on what kind of security was purchased." They 
noted that Blackie, while allowing reliance on the integrity of 
the market to establish causation, also allowed that presumption 
to be overcome if the defendant could show a lack of reliance.I ' 
The dissent perceived full and fair disclosure as a primary 
objective of the Securities Acts, disagreeing with what the ma-
jority saw as the central role of rule 10b-5.la In contrast to the 
consumer-oriented legislation of the 1960s and 1970s, the "fed-
eral securities laws are based on the premise that the federal 
government's role is merely to ensure the free flow of complete 
and accurate information within the Nation's securities mar-
61. 647 F.2d at 470. 
62. Id. at 471. 
63.Id. 
64. "The reliance that produces causation in the [case of a more pervasive fraud) 
cannot come from reading a document." Id. at 472. 
65. Id. at 473. 
66.Id. 
67. Id. at 478-79. 
68. Id. at 481. 
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kets."69 Once that disclosure had been accomplished, the inves-
tor should be expected to protect himself; the "fairness of the 
terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the 
statute. "70 
The dissent's position was that the goal of the Securities 
Acts, a high standard of business ethics in the securities indus-
try, would be furthered by precluding recovery to a plaintiff who 
had made an investment decision without reference to the infor-
mation promulgated under the disclosure requirements. "In 
short, the federal securities laws are intended to put investors 
into a position from which they can help themselves by relying 
upon disclosures that others are obligated to make. This system 
is not furthered by allowing monetary recovery to those who re-
fuse to look out for themselves.,m 
III. DISCUSSION 
Because of the virtually unlimited language of rule lOb-5 
and its judicially created cause of action, the duty of limiting the 
applicability of the rule has fallen to the courts.7lI This has been 
accomplished by requiring various elements of tort liability to 
establish causation. First required in List, as one of the tradi-
tional elements of common law fraud, reliance by the plaintiff on 
the defendant's action or inaction has been one of those neces-
sary elements of proof. 
Whenever there is any proposed expansion of the lOb-5 
cause of action, the courts must evaluate the expansion in light 
of increased litigation or any interference with relevant state 
law, as well as considering whether such an extension will fulfill 
the legislative purposes of the Securities Acts." The circuits 
have attempted to find equitable solutions where plaintiffs have 
69. [d. at 482. 
70. [d. at 482 (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977). 
71. [d. at 483. Surveying Supreme Court decisions, the dissent noted a consistent 
refusal to eliminate any of the basic elements of a 10b-5 action, and that reliance was 
one of those long standing requirements. [d. at 484 (citing Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 
(1980); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 
U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 723 (1973». 
72. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1973), the Court 
wrote of the unanticipated growth of the 10b-5 actions, and the Court's duty to delineate 
what was a "judicially created cause of action. 
73. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
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been victims of defendants' wrongdoing. The Shores majority 
noted that doing away with proof of reliance where there are 
material misstatements or omissions would essentially institute 
a system of investor's insurance, counter to what the legislature 
had intended in the Securities Acts.7• But the court has given 
investors an opportunity to avoid the requirement of reliance by 
alleging fraud on a broader scale. 
Theoretically, the burden which is now placed on the defen-
dant is no more exacting than that which was previously placed 
on the plaintiff to prove reliance. The Blackie court provided at 
least two ways for the defendant to meet this burden.711 Practi-
cally, however, this theory of the integrity of the market and re-
liance on that integrity to produce valid securities almost seems 
to eliminate a defendant's means of disproving reliance and lead 
to far greater liability. Unless the defendant can prove that the 
plaintiff is a totally unreasonable investor-purchasing without 
regard to market knowledge-or that the fraud involved would 
not have any material effect on the price or information regard-
ing the securities (two situations which are difficult to imagine in 
a financial world of easily influenced and quickly fluctuating 
stock prices), then the presumption will be that the defendant is 
responsible for the plaintiff's loss. The notion that without re-
searching any of the disclosure documents made available, a 
purchaser can simply presume that anything on the market is 
valid seems to be a considerable step in the direction of insured 
investments. 
Looking at the legislative scheme, the Securities Acts were 
set up as disclosure statutes, not only demanding full disclosure 
of issurers, brokers, dealers, and underwriters, but also obligat-
ing the investor to some form of diligence.78 As one commentator 
observed: "Two significant policy considerations behind the Se-
curities Acts are providing full access to relevant information 
and market stability. Market stability may be threatened as 
much by investor carelessness as it is by manipulations, and full 
access is useless if investors are not encouraged to take advan-
tage of that access. "77 
74. 647 F.2d at 469 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981). 
75. See text accompanying note 48, supra. 
76. Crane, supra note 32, at 111. 
77. Id. 
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In a fraudulent securities scheme, however, a plaintiff 
should also be given an opportunity to recover from a defen-
dant's willful manipulation and wrongdoing. The rule was en-
acted to protect investors as well,n and by allowing a presump-
tion of reliance to assist the plaintiff through the stage of 
summary judgment, he will be afforded an opportunity to prove 
a scheme which may perpetrate fraud on the entire investment 
community. Perhaps the view of the Blackie courtthat "reliance 
as a separate requirement is simply a milepost on the road to 
causation"T' is correct. Possibly reliance should not be de-
manded of a plaintiff to prove causation, but should be only one 
of the possible elements which would prove that defendant's 
wrongdoing resulted in plaintiff's harm. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Central to the determination of the applicability of the 
fraud on the market theory is an ascertainment of the goals of 
the Securities Acts. If the Acts were designed to promote market 
stability, then informed decisions by investors are called for and 
allowing reliance on the general integrity of the market does not 
promote that goal. If instead the aim is investor protection, then 
clearly the fraud on the market theory advances that protection. 
The policy of the courts has been to cut off defendant's lia-
bility at the point where there is no reliance by the plaintiff on 
the defendant's misrepresentations or omissions. Allowing reli-
ance on the integrity of the market, however, expands a plain-
tiff's opportunity for recovery when there is no reliance on those 
specific misstatements or omissions, but merely a belief that an-
ything which can be purchased on the market has been placed 
there without fraud. 
While the validity of this doctrine remains to be tested in 
the Supreme Court, there is disagreement among the judges on 
the individual courts and among the different circuits as to what 
degree of reliance is necessary to establish causation. While in-
vestors do have a duty to make informed decisions, obviously a 
fraudulent security should not be permitted to remain on the 
market, and the harm which results from its issue and trading 
78. 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 3, at § 6. 
79. 524 F.2d at 906 n.22 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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should be compensated. Recently, in Chiarella, in keeping with 
its recent contraction of lOb-5 liability, the Supreme Court re-
fused to formulate a broader duty when asked to expand liabil-
ity beyond its traditional scope.80 Adoption of a fraud on the 
market theory would certainly increase the liability of potential 
defendants beyond the traditional limitations established requir-
ing proof of reliance. If the Court is faced with this doctrine 
while continuing its present course, it most likely would refuse 
to find liability for harm which results from a plaintiff's reliance 
on only the integrity of the market to establish valid securities. 
Because the securities regulations require disclosure, a decision 
of the Court not to allow proof of the element of reliance in this 
manner would be in accordance with those requirements. But, 
investors who are not aware of the levels of financial sophistica-
tion and the areas open to deception within the investing world 
would still be without a remedy for fraud on the market. Per-
haps what is called for is not a new application of lOb-5, but a 
new anti-fraud statute which would insure that such harms do 
not go without redress. 
M. Lynn Haggerty 
SO. 445 U.S. at 233 (1981). But in John Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, (1981 Transfer 
binder] FED. SEC. L. RPl'R. (CCH) 'II 97,900, a dissent to a per curiam opinion indicated 
that the court might be willing to expand another of the antifraud provisions-§ 12(2) of 
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976)-by imposing a higher standard of reasonable 
investigation on underwriters when they examine an issuer's financial statement before 
release. (ld. Powell and Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting). Should the prospectus be released 
with the misrepresentation, the underwriter could be held liable as well as the issuer. See 
Symposium-Securities Law, 30 EMORY L.J. I, 6 (1981). See also Steadman v. SEC, 450 
U.S. 91 (1981), allowing the SEC to prove a violation of antifraud provision § 17(a) of the 
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) (1976), by the standard of a preponderance of evidence, re-
gardless of later possibly severe sanctions based on the same judgement. 
While the court is refusing to expand the application of IOb-5 liability, in other 
areas of antifraud perhaps it is not so predisposed. 
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